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Given the fundamental necessity of reliable taxon-
omy for biology, it is surprising that taxonomy is so
frequently misunderstood. Even former disciplines of
“natural history” with their roots in the taxonomic
tradition frequently attack taxonomy on false grounds
in spite of the dependence of such fields upon credi-
ble taxonomic information. We review and refute a
number of such myths and misconceptions about tax-
onomy that seem to contribute to an indefensible lack
of respect and support for taxonomists and their col-
lections. We will discuss these myths and misconcep-
tions in no particular order.
Taxonomy is “descriptive”. It is unclear why being
descriptive is seen as negative by some experimental
biologists; without accurate descriptive work all
branches of natural history would be subjective and
unreliable. Taxonomy is descriptive, of course, yet
much of the substance of its descriptions –characters,
species and clades– is based upon explicitly testable
hypotheses about sameness and group membership.
Because of the nature of evolution biologists deal to a
very great extent with unique organisms, groups of or-
ganisms and attributes of organisms, making descrip-
tive work inordinately important. That said, the hy-
potheses embedded in layers of taxonomic work and
their rigorously testable nature make taxonomy both
hypothesis-driven and scrupulously scientific. An in-
nuendo implicit in such “it’s only descriptive” criti-
cisms is that taxonomy is, therefore, somehow less sci-
entific. That, however, is simply false (e.g., Gaffney,
1979; Nelson & Platnick, 1981).
Taxonomy is typological. Adherents to the New Sys-
tematics, and particularly Ernst Mayr (1942, 1969),
perpetuated the myth that taxonomy is based upon ty-
pological thinking but this is neither historical nor
contemporaneous fact. Perhaps because taxonomists
use “type” specimens as standards for scientific
names, the shared word root lent subconscious cre-
dence to Mayr’s claims. The claim was ludicrous in the
first place given that taxonomists were among the first
biologists to confront the problem of variability
(Cracraft, 2000). The taxonomists’ “method of types”
(called instead by historian of science Mary P. Winsor
“method of exemplars”) is not essentialist as recently
detailed (Winsor, 2003). Thus, neither Linnaeus nor
any of his followers deserve the claim of Mayr that
they were essentialists-typologists (Winsor, 2006).
Species of taxonomy are subjective. Several attempts
have been made to replace explicit, testable species
hypotheses in taxonomy with alternatives, often sug-
gested by scientists in fields outside taxonomy only
marginally engaged (if at all) in species discovery.
Species exist. Were this not so and there were only
one super-species on Earth, Darwin would have se-
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Points of view
lected a different title for his book and taxonomy
would have outlived its utility by the turn of the 19th
century. Let us be precise: species can be testable, rig-
orously scientific hypotheses. But DNA “barcodes”
applied to species exploration and discovery (outside
the context of corroborated species) are not (see Lit-
tle & Stevenson, 2007). In spite of declarations to the
contrary, “species” based on genetic distances are
merely arbitrary constructs of convenience that only
occasionally correspond to truly evolutionarily mean-
ingful entities. Such crude species estimates are for
the moment popular in bacteriology where evolution-
ary thinking has yet to arrive in regard to species
(Goldenfeld & Woese, 2007). In a bizarre twist, some
studying Eukaryotes where rigorous species applica-
tions exist are following suit with DNA-based esti-
mates (Hebert & Gregory, 2005). The only conceiv-
able explanation is the relative ease of securing fund-
ing for such inferior species discovery tools, for DNA
barcodes indeed result in subjective species.
There is no single necessary or sufficient species con-
cept. Today we have several dozens of species con-
cepts and, in several cases, an interesting distinction
between concept and criteria. Paraphrasing Galileo,
despite this species Babel, taxonomy remains alive
and very active describing between ten and twenty
thousand new animal species (and a lesser number of
plant species) every year. A recent synthesis of the ori-
gin of species (Coyne & Orr, 2004) has been praised as
if of comparable merit to Darwin’s Origin (Meyer,
2004) but at the same time declared “simply dogmat-
ic” (Hollacher, 2006). Taxonomists know better.
What is important is the empirical world, the observ-
able attributes of species that are inherited in their
original or some modified form (Platnick, 1979).
It remains important that we achieve a universally
applicable species concept if possible in order to com-
pare species richness of areas and ecosystems as well
as various modes of evolution. Those who would sim-
ply give up and say that life is so diverse that a plural-
istic approach to species is necessary are invariably fo-
cused on micro-evolutionary processes rather than
historical patterns. The many traits that vary within
populations and species create a fog of irrelevant, 
uninformative and misleading information. When
“characters” (in the strict sense of Nixon & Wheeler
1992) are teased apart from such traits and when the
vast range of processes that contribute to speciation
(e.g., allopatry, sexual selection, etc.) are set aside
from the interpretation of patterns of character distri-
bution, it is possible to recognize species as the end re-
sults of any or all micro-evolutionary causes. Such a
species concept based only on patterns has been pro-
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posed in the form of the Phylogenetic Species Con-
cept (Wheeler & Platnick, 2000 and references there-
in). Much of the current confusion results from each
taxon expert emphasizing the processes evident (or
assumed) for those organisms; this ignores the impor-
tant lesson from cladistics to distinguish pattern from
unnecessary assumptions of process (Eldredge &
Cracraft, 1980; Nelson & Platnick, 1981).
Taxonomy as a mindless, mechanistic procedure. Pe-
riodically, attempts are made to replace taxonomists
with a mechanical system that matches shapes and
sizes, as if the activity of identifying species were noth-
ing more than matching morphometrics or arbitrarily
chosen distances (e.g., Sokal & Rohlf, 1966; Rohlf &
Sokal, 1967). Certainly taxonomy could be reduced to
nothing more than arbitrary image-matching, but why
should that be considered an advance? The lesson of
the 1970s that such “objective” uses of overall similar-
ity does not mirror evolutionary history has seemingly
been forgotten by some. For example, some propo-
nents of DNA barcoding adopt the same bankrupt as-
sumptions using instead mere genetic distances.
Taxonomy is quantitatively challenged. Because tax-
onomy is an historical science, the usual statistical as-
sumptions simply do not apply: what kind of “uni-
verse” exists for a historical question? There is, by de-
finition, precisely one sequence of events that is the
past. Without a universe of equally possible histories,
standard statistics are powerless.  Because of the na-
ture of evolutionary novelties and their inheritance 
by descendant species (Platnick, 1979; Nelson & Plat-
nick, 1981), however, precise predictions about char-
acter distributions make taxonomic assertions both
scientific and testable. Still, because taxonomy is
not experimental many biologists falsely hold it in sus-
picion. 
Taxonomy is old. Because taxonomy has been prac-
tised for centuries and because Linnaeus got some
things “right” such that they are equally useful today
(e.g., binomial nomenclature, hierarchical groupings,
etc.), it is seen by many as out-dated (Valdecasas & al.,
2007). As a result, every new wave of technology is ac-
companied by calls to replace the “old” taxonomy
with this or that new technology. Taxonomy has been
incredibly adept at integrating new technologies, par-
ticularly those that led to discovery of new characters
or improved testing of existing ones. Taxonomy will
continue to incorporate and adapt new tools as they
come along. However, we are well advised to not un-
derestimate the incredibly potent eye-brain dyad in
discerning meaningful patterns among characters and
species and the fact that high-tech solutions are not
needed for every problem. Taxonomy is constantly
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reinventing itself through new tools and improved
theories and methods. To denounce it as “old” is as
silly as abandoning physics or chemistry or medicine
for the same reason.
Taxonomy is inefficient. This is a variant on “taxon-
omy is old”, but is difficult to quantify. As we have
said, taxonomists are quick to apply new technologies
and therefore constantly improve upon efficiency. It is
true that virtually every step of taxonomic research,
from field collecting and specimen preparation to
publication, could and should be improved upon. It is
also true that the next generation of cyber-infrastruc-
ture promises to open numerous bottlenecks that
have held back more rapid taxonomy in the past
(Page & al., 2005). Some aspects of science are more
labor intensive than others. As we assess new tools for
improved efficiency, we need to be careful that we not
sacrifice excellence for nothing more worthy than
speed. Thoughtful implementation of new ways and
means can be done to enhance, not diminish, excel-
lence.
Confrontation and Science
Confrontation of ideas is central and necessary for
the advance of science. Taxonomy has a well-deserved
reputation as a particularly confrontational branch of
science, as indeed it has been. Taxonomy was the
foundation of the evolution and recapitulation de-
bates of the 19th century; it was the framework from
which modern population biology emerged in the ear-
ly 20th century; and Hennig’s theories have returned a
historical context to nearly every biological sub-disci-
pline. Perhaps the most ferocious examples, however,
were in the 1970s, when evolutionary taxonomy, phe-
netics, cladistics and traditional taxonomy clashed
again and again as, for example, in the pages of jour-
nals such as Systematic Zoology (Hull, 1988).
Debates are most effective when they consist of a
clash of ideas rather than of personalities. Once argu-
ments become truly personal, they descend rapidly
into unproductive ad hominem attacks. We are con-
cerned that attacks are leveled on taxonomy with little
concern for hearing alternative points of view or a
clear desire to seek the truth. There exists a cynical
milieu in which well-funded science is assumed to be
“good” science and alternative views that might en-
danger funding are quieted. 
We are concerned that there are not louder and
more debates at the moment over the assumptions
routinely made by molecular phylogeneticists, that
seem to be phenetic at best and to contravene some of
the most basic theoretical advances made by Hennig
(1966). Similarly, there should be much greater outcry
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over proposals for the PhyloCode and for DNA bar-
coding and DNA taxonomy, all of which violate fun-
damental assumptions of “good” taxonomy. As long
as lucrative grants exist to fund molecular work it
seems that ignoring two centuries of theoretical ad-
vances and empirical lessons is acceptable.
Ironically, the same phylogenetic reconstructions
that were to assure that taxonomy produced a “gener-
al reference system” are now done divorced from the
character considerations central to Hennigian reason-
ing (e.g., special similarity). Cladograms are no longer
a means toward that reference system but rather an
end produced in service to other branches of biology.
That is, this aspect of taxonomy has ceased to be a re-
search paradigm of its own and only a means to a
framework for the interpretation of other people’s
data. We seem poised now, thanks to DNA barcod-
ing, to also abandon good science surrounding
species discovery in order to “better serve” those
same other branches of biology. This is ironic, of
course, in that the best taxonomy comes from taxono-
my done to its own highest standards. Users seem
content with inferior products; molecular “taxono-
mists” with providing them. We need to question cur-
rent assumptions, adhere to defensible theories, and
adapt the right tools for particular jobs.
Species and Rhetoric
When an idea is relentlessly repeated it can come to
be seen as a virtual absolute truth. Such has happened
with the concept of species within zoology with the
Biological Species Concept relentlessly promoted by
Mayr (1942, 1963, 1969, 2000).
A long-standing implicit approach to species with-
in the taxonomic community involves recognizing
groups of organisms that share a unique combination
of characters. Mayr tried to minimize the credibility of
the concept by referring to it as the “morphological”
species concept, as though it took no notice of genet-
ics. And by describing it, falsely, as being typological
(see above). This traditional species concept has been
formalized as the Phylogenetic Species Concept
(PSC, see Cracraft, 1983; Nelson & Platnick, 1981;
Nixon & Wheeler, 1990; Wheeler & Platnick, 2000),
not to be confused with the “phylogenetic” concept
advocated by Mishler and Theriot (2000) among oth-
ers. That concept might better be called the Autapo-
morphic Species Concept as it insists that each species
be “monophyletic” (see Wheeler & Platnick, 2000).
Modes of speciation are nearly as diverse as life it-
self (e.g., Mayr, 1963; Otte & Endler, 1989). Thus,
when biologists have attempted to impose their par-
ticular views of the speciation causation in their fa-
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vorite taxon upon the recognition of species it has re-
sulted in a proliferation of species concepts, each lim-
ited in its applicability. From our perspective this is an
unfortunate development. It means that it is impossi-
ble to compare numbers of species across taxa,
ecosystems or modes of speciation. It is important
that we be able to assess such differences in order to
address fundamental questions about evolution. For
example, is there greater species diversity in compara-
ble areas of tropical as opposed to temperate habitat?
Do non-sexual lineages evolve (measured in number
of distinct species) faster than sexual ones? Why are
there vastly more species of insects than of birds?
We see only two solutions to the “species prob-
lem”. It would be possible to simply acknowledge
this diversity of processes and to accept a plurality
of species concepts as advocated by Mishler &
Donoghue (1982) among others. Because this so con-
strains our ability to assess patterns broadly (as stated
above), such an admission of hopeless plurality
should be a last resort. The other solution is to avoid
direct reference or inference of mechanisms of speci-
ation and to focus instead on patterns of character dis-
tributions. Stated another way, adhere to the tradi-
tional approach of taxonomists.
A primary reason to seek to recognize species is to
acknowledge the “end products” of evolutionary his-
tory. Just as having a cladogram provides a chrono-
logical framework in which to assess various evolu-
tionary processes, having species reflect patterns 
of characters that are the evidence of evolutionary 
history provides a similar starting point to compare
processes.
What can be done and what ought to be done
“Unable to separate can do from should do, we suffer a
kind of technological immune deficiency syndrome that ren-
ders us vulnerable to whatever can be done and too weak to
question what it is that we should do”. David Orr, 2002
The estimation of what is useful and important
should not rest only or even primarily on criteria of
novelty. In science, there is an understandable premi-
um on innovation but there are many useful concepts
that are not new. No one would suggest exclusion of
anatomy from medicine, the periodic table from
chemistry, or the laws of thermodynamics from
physics, yet in biology, taxonomy is often seen as
anachronistic only because it got fundamentals of the
field correct long ago.
What should be done? In the midst of a biodiversi-
ty crisis (Wilson, 1992) we should make species ex-
ploration, discovery and description an extremely
high priority. We should make the growth and devel-
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opment of natural history collections to serve as com-
prehensive evidence of species and clade diversity a
high priority. And we should make the practice of tax-
onomy according to its very best theories and meth-
ods a mandate, since we have only one chance to chart
the biosphere.
Instead funds flow to the latest molecular tech-
niques that we seem to do only because we now can,
not because they offer improved estimates of species
or reference systems.
What makes “good” taxonomy good?
A good species description is a standard in perpe-
tuity. High quality descriptive taxonomy publications
are cited and studied and referenced for centuries.
Taxa new to science are, of course, not frequently cit-
ed by biologists in general, severely constraining the
citation impact of taxonomic papers. The minimiza-
tion of taxonomic publication impact is also driven by
users of such publications and names without citation
by non-taxonomists and the fact that citation impact
measures limit themselves to a few years. The fact that
taxonomic publications are not adequately evaluated
by existing systems of citation tracking was first point-
ed out by Valdecasas & al. (2000). A specialist might
only be cited by half a dozen colleagues, yet the quali-
ty of his work may be extremely high. Further, the
gold standard publications of taxonomy, mono-
graphs, are not even included in such indexes (Wheel-
er & Valdecasas, 2005). 
It would be interesting were there an index of taxo-
nomic performance (ITP) adopted that could help
scale on numerical grounds the value of taxonomic
works. It should not be difficult to take account of
variables within taxonomy such as the number of
species studied (comprehensiveness), the inclusion of
diagnostic and identification sections (utility), etc. In
this way the relative merit of the paper could be indi-
cated as well as its citation by other authors. Compre-
hensive monographs would rank very highly on such 
a scale, while isolated species descriptions would be
much lower. It has also been suggested that with the
advent of electronic publishing it would be possible 
to link names from such monographs through Zoo-
Bank to electronic journals and to track the use of
names from a monograph in any biological publica-
tion, whether or not its author was cited (Wheeler,
2007).
Conclusion
In conclusion, taxonomy is not a minor discipline
of biological science but rather a fundamental and ab-
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solutely necessary discipline. Many of its theories and
methods are not new or perceived to be spectacular,
yet when done to high standards it underpins credible
biological research and is rigorously scientific. Given
the urgency of advancing taxonomic knowledge and
exploring Earth’s species, it is intolerable that numer-
ous myths and misconceptions continue to serve as
excuses to not elevate the stature and funding for tax-
onomy and collections. Taxonomists have an obliga-
tion to promote and defend good taxonomy, to adopt
and adapt new tools of course, but in a way that ex-
tends rather than undermines existing excellence.
Newcomers to taxonomy or related fields need to
learn the theory and traditions and unique require-
ments of taxonomy and accord to taxonomy the same
considerations due to any other discipline. 
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